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several arbitration proceedings between states and concessionaires, this
chapter is both pertinent and useful.
It should be observed that in neither of the books under review is
there any reference to an earlier monograph by Simon G. Siksek which
also dealt with the legal principles governing oil concessions in the Arab
world,6 and that there is also no reference to much of the material listed
in Mr. Siksek's bibliography. Treatment of the development of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Iranian
oil nationalization of 1951, certainly two of the major factors in the evolution of oil concessions, is rather inadequate.
Mr. Cattan's two books will be of great interest to lawyers, government officials, business executives, and oil experts who are in any way
involved in the international petroleum industry. Although some of his
views are somewhat controversial and the books are marred by some faults
in scholarship, Mr. Cattan has made a valuable contribution to the comprehensive treatment of a significant and complex area of law and policy.
His work should also be of interest and use to all students of international
law and arbitration, particularly those concerned with the legal framework
of state contracts.
Frank R. Power*

THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 19491963: AN INTRODUCTION. By Jerome A. Cohen.t Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1968. Pp. 706. $15.00.
American lack of knowledge of the Chinese and their culture, a consequence of both linguistic and political barriers, has been remarkable:
"The American public," said a report issued . . . by the Council on

Foreign Relations, "is not well informed about China." That is hardly
the half of it - at least according to a survey of 1,501 people done
for the council, a nonprofit institution (board chairman: John J.
McCloy), by the University of Michigan's Survery Research Center.
When asked, "What kind of government does most of China have
now ?" or "Do you happen to know if there is any Communist government in China now?", an incredible 28% indicated that they did not
know. Moreover, 39% did not know of the existence of the Nationalist
Chinese government.1
Today through ignorance we are "caught in a role which has been partly
thrust upon us and which we do not want: that of the outside oppressor,
6. S. SIKSZK, Tim LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE ARAB
WORLD (1960). Mr. Siksek deals at some length with the Hendryx-Ray controversy

discussed in note 5 supra.
* Member of the New York Bar. B.C.E., Manhattan College, 1960; M.S.,
Cornell University 1964; LL.B., New York University 1966. Assistant Secretary
and Senior Attorney, American Independent Oil Company.

t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.

1. The Chinese Who?, TIME, Dec. 25, 1964, at 15.
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last target of Mao's revolution, tied in with the evils of China's past, cause
of her inadequacies and obstacle to her rise." 2 Rational reformulation
of our Asian policies requires national understanding of the attitudes and
goals of the Chinese people and their leaders.
Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School, has
been instrumental in awakening the interest of the academic community to
legal developments in Communist China. His book, designed for use in
the classroom, combines Chinese documentary materials and commentary
of foreign observers with evidence obtained by him in interviews with refugees in Hong Kong.3 Juxtaposition of official description and evaluations and informal statements by those who have participated in the
processes discussed provides a previously unavailable view of the law in
action. The scope of the study is broader than its title would suggest;
it deals not only with criminal procedure but also with substantive criminal
law; moreover, as in traditional China, criminal law forms the core of the
legal system.
Although the materials collected by Professor Cohen offer an unparalleled introduction to legal developments on the Chinese mainland
since the Communist triumph, their primary value lies in their ability to
stimulate analytic inquiry. Evaluation of the role in shaping current institutions of seemingly reinforcing influences found in both Chinese history
and Marxist doctrine presents frequent challenges. Since many vaguely
perceived characteristics of Western legal systems appear sharply defined
in contemporary Chinese practice, comparative study readily yields principles of importance in solving problems of our own society. One recent
analysis of Chinese criminal law concludes:
[Ilt is impossible to elucidate the basic concepts in the criminal law
of Communist China in terms of a realistic penal theory based on the
postulate of the "free-will" of human beings. One can hardly avoid
the conclusion that the Chinese Communist legal system, under the
influence of Marxist-Maoist ideology, is one in which order is superior
to justice, and the law, particularly the criminal law, is largely a
political weapon used by the Chinese Communist Party ....

Professor

Lon L. Fuller would conclude that, judging on the basis of the eight
directions set forth by him, this legal system not only4 is a bad system,
but can not properly be called a legal system at all.
At the very least, these materials demonstrate the impropriety of such
efforts to evaluate the Chinese system through simple application of
Western standards without consideration of the premises and goals of an
alien civilization.
2. Fairbank, Book Review, N.Y. R v. oi BooKs, March 28, 1968, at 27, 30.
3. See Cohen, Interviewing Chinese Refugees: Indispensable Aid to Legal
Research on China, 20 J. LEGAL En. 33 (1967).
4. Tao, The Criminal Law of Communist China, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 43, 68 & n.194
(1966).
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In his lengthy introduction 5 Professor Cohen differentiates three major
periods in the development of Chinese law between 1949 and 1963. In
the first, which extended from the time of Communist conquest until 1953,
"the criminal process served as a blunt instrument of terror, as the Chinese
Communist Party proceeded relentlessly to crush all sources of political
opposition and to rid society of a political but antisocial elements who
plagued public order" (p. 9). From the spring of 1953 until June 1957
efforts were made, following the Soviet model, to establish "the framework of an orderly system for the administration of justice" (p. 11),
which provided at least minimal protection against arbitrary oppression.
Reaction to excessive criticism as a result of the "hundred flowers" movement in 1957 led to abandonment of procedural safeguards of the western
type and reversion to a more rigidly totalitarian pattern differing from
that of the first stage primarily in the effectiveness of centralized controls
and the diminished need for harsh tactics.
Sharp disagreement concerning the sources of modern Chinese doctrine persists:
How opposed are Communist and Confucian values and institutions?
How much intellectual and institutional continuity persists, overt or
covert, conscious or disguised? In the West, the "sinological determinists" suggest that if you scratch a Communist, you will find a
Confucian. At the other extreme, some observers, preoccupied with
Communist-led social change, deny all continuity."
Proof of the importance of either set of antecedents appears impossible;
the system is overdetermined, so that in many instances opposing theorists
can construct equally convincing models supporting their positions.
Debate over the basis of a present preference for dispute resolution
through informal negotiation rather than by court action illustrates the
difficulties encountered. The materials demonstrate the prevalence of
"people's mediation committees," groups of low-level activists, often women,
who are in practice authorized to apply informal pressure to settle or
repress minor conflicts between individuals posing no political threat to
the regime. Similar efforts are frequently undertaken by members of other
organizations, including the police.
Professor Cohen states that in establishing mediation committees the
Communists "were consciously building upon the traditional Chinese
preference for coping with disputes and antisocial conduct by means of
persuasion and informal pressures" (p. 123). His assertion is easily supported. In traditional China, use of the courts was discouraged: "[T]o
indulge in litigation was regarded as immoral. The 'first best' and socially
proper way to settle disputes, used by the 'superior man,' was by the
5. For an earlier version of this essay see Cohen, The Criminal Process in the
People's Republic of China: An Introduction, 79 HARV. L. Rev. 469 (1966).

6. Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist

China, 55 CALiF. L. REv. 1284, 1287-88 (1967).
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method of mediation, following the ethics of the 'middle way.' "" The
corruptness of the magistrates and their subordinates, frequent use of torture, and "insistence upon at least token punishment for anyone becoming
entangled with the law, regardless of circumstances," s made resort to law
almost always imprudent. Inadequacy of state-authorized solutions led to
substitution of private mechanisms at the village, clan, and guild levels,
providing obvious prototypes for contemporary techniques.
Professor Cohen has elsewhere added, however, that "despite the fact
that the techniques of 'criticism and self-criticism' have long been employed
by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the prominence of mediation
in contemporary China does not appear to be attributable to importation
of the Soviet political-legal model." 9 Professor Lubman has recently opposed this position, pointing to Communist willingness to compel ideologically correct results even at the expense of dissatisfaction of one or more of
the parties involved. He urges:
Contemporary Chinese dispute resolution seems to owe more to
Communist ideology, experience, and practice than it does to Confucian tradition ....

While it may be "tempting" to regard Communist

mediators as "successors to the gentry and other prestige figures who
settled most of the disputes of village, clan, and guild," it would be
dangerous to yield to this temptation. Both the purposes which the
Communists have assigned to mediation and the mediators and the
style they are expected to use in resolving disputes contrast sharply
with traditional resolution.' 0
Conclusive determination of priorities of influence seems unlikely.
Many sanctions usually classified as criminal in Western legal thought
may in China be ordered administratively without judicial determination
of culpability. The Security Administration Punishment Act of 1957 authorizes autonomous imposition by the police of penalties including incarceration for a period of up to 15 days. Close supervision of the work
patterns and ideological development of the individual can likewise be
directed free from court scrutiny. Rehabilitation through labor programs
permit administrative confinement for periods once unlimited but since
1962 at least formally restricted to a maximum of 3 years. One person
interviewed relates a 1958 assertion by an official that the only significant difference between the harshest administrative penalties and reform
through labor, imprisonment decreed by a court, is that the latter is for
a fixed period.
Law in traditional China was based on a criminal code setting penalties
for the commission of a large number of narrowly defined offenses. Coin7. Northrop, The Mediational Approval Theory of Law in American Legal
Realism, 44 VA. L. REv. 347, 349 (1958).
8. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA: EXEMPLIFIED BY 190
CH'ING DYNASTY CASES 195 (1967).
9. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
1201, 1204 (1966).
10. Lubman, supra note 6, at 1358 (quoting Cohen, supra note 9, at 1226).
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prehensive coverage in spite of such specificity was facilitated by a section
stating: "[T]here may be cases to which no laws or statutes are precisely
applicable; such cases may be determined, by an accurate comparison
with others which are already provided for, and which approach most
nearly to those under investigation ....,"l In addition, a catch-all statute
provided alternative penalties of 80 blows of the heavy bamboo or 40 blows
2
of the light bamboo for "doing what ought not to be done.'
Modern Chinese law evidences a parallel approach. The Security
Administration Punishment Act, for example, explicitly proscribes "struggling to be first to board a ferry, in disregard of an order to stop,"
"creating the possibility of an incident by selling tickets of admission to
public amusement places in excess of their capacity, in disregard of dissuasion," and "damaging tree seedlings in a nursery in a way that does
not create serious loss." Those who commit unenumerated acts "which
violate security administration" are also to receive sanctions (Pp. 217-18,
220). The Act for Punishment of Counterrevolution of 1951 similarly
provides: "Those who, with a counterrevolutionary purpose, commit crimes
not covered by the provisions of this Act may be given punishments prescribed for crimes [enumerated] in this Act which are comparable to the
crimes committed" (p. 302). The range of conduct thus brought within
its scope may be broader than one might at first suppose: one report,
for example, celebrates the capture of a fugitive who "had more than nine
times engaged in sabotage activity including arson, rape, and theft"
(Pp. 356-57).
On seizing power in 1949 the Communist leaders repudiated the entire
Nationalist legal structure. Plans for introduction of a comprehensive
criminal code were abandoned following the antirightist reaction of 1957:
other legislation covers only isolated categories of criminal conduct. Communist literature classifies as criminal "all acts which endanger the people's
democratic system, undermine the legal order or are socially dangerous
and, according to law, should be subject to criminal punishment" (p. 318).
Regulations defining common crimes and establishing maximum and minimum penalties for their commission have been circulated among officials
but have not been published. It is argued that acts punished as criminal
without statutory delineation, such as murder or arson, are so obviously
antisocial as to render objections of lack of notice facetious. Such an
approach is not wholly unfamiliar: Jerome Hall has asserted that "inasmuch as normal persons share common attitudes regarding the elementary
interests protected by the criminal law, it is a fair inference that the doer
3
of a proscribed harm knows that his conduct is immoral.'
Criticism of the modern Chinese legal system has stressed its lack of
procedural safeguards. Joint effort by officials guiding the criminal process
11. Quoted in D. BoDn. & C. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 520.
12. Id. at 517-33.
13. Quoted in M. MAY4R, THt LAWYERS 167 (1967). See Note, Common Law

Crimes in the United States, 47 COLUm. L. lRv. 1332 (1947).
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precludes those checks to arbitrary action considered fundamental to our
own law:
[B]ecause of cooperation among our three families - the procuracy,
the public security organs, and the courts - we have launched a
security movement, [the implementation of] which has served as a
goal of the political-legal departments' joint struggle. . . . [W]e are
marching in unison. . . . [W]hen the three departments, under the

unified leadership of the party committee, divide their labor and cooperate, they are more united internally. As a result, the three departments become one fist and attack the enemy even more forcefully
(p. 424).
As the Confucian generalist formerly counted application of the law among
his duties as magistrate, the modern political leader, not the legally trained
cadre, ultimately controls the punishment imposed. A 1958 attack on
rightists within the procuracy alleged:
They say that "the procuratorial organs are judicial organs, are only
responsible to the law, should not be responsible to the Party, and that
the procuracy cannot be the yes-man of the Party committee"; their
insolence is such that they want to supervise and put themselves above
the Party committee (p. 383).
Today public trials in cases considered criminal by Western standards
are normally morality plays staged to mobilize mass support for administration policies; adjudication in many instances has atrophied to little more
than interview of the accused by a judge who already is reasonably certain
of his culpability. Where more substantial intervention by the judiciary
is urged protection of the defendant is not its purpose:
When a people's court adjudicates cases, it definitely cannot maintain a neutral position between the prosecutor and the defendant. A
people's court is a weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat and,
although there is a division of labor and responsibility between it and
the public security and procuratorial organs, the three organs perform
the common task of suppressing enemies, punishing criminals, and
protecting the people. A court cannot serve as a "just" arbitrator
between the prosecutor and the defendant, and even less can it maintain neutrality. It should actively take the initiative in investigating
criminals and in punishing them (p. 472).
The accused has only limited opportunity to rebut the charges against him:
"[I]t is permissible for criminal defendants (criminals) to defend themselves, with the precondition that they not violate policies and laws and
not distort the facts" (p. 473). Defense counsel, when employed, generally
merely argue for mitigation of punishment. Appeal from conviction is
normally allowed but seldom undertaken even by defendants aware of
their opportunity, since penalties may be increased as well as reduced by
a higher court or on remand and further litigation may indicate lack
of repentence.
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Superficial comparison of Chinese and American systems of criminal
procedure may overemphasize their disparity. The drama of the jury
trial can divert attention from the fact that the vast majority of our own
criminal sentences are negotiated settlements made possible by admission
of guilt. Procedural safeguards may be of little use to the disadvantaged
individual who can nevertheless be proved guilty but needs rehabilitative
assistance unobtainable either within or outside the prison. The strength
of our presumption of innocence is the basis of a fictive decision, Rex v.
Haddock, reported by A. P. Herbert.' 4 In this case a judgment fining a
man who had jumped from Hammersmith Bridge into the Thames on a
bet was affirmed on appeal. One justice stated:
It is a principle of English law that a person who appears in a
police court has done something undesirable, and citizens who take it
upon themselves to do unusual actions which attract the attention of
the police should be careful to bring these actions into one of the
recognized categories of crimes and offenses, for it is intolerable that
the police should be put to the pains of inventing reasons for finding
them undesirable ....

It is not for me to say what offense the appellant

has committed, but I am satisfied that he has committed some offense,
for which he has been most properly punished."
Another concluded that the defendant was guilty of polluting a watercourse.
Criminal procedure in any legal system embodies a balancing by the
community of the disadvantages of convicting the innocent and failing to
convict the guilty. Common and civil law jurisdictions have traditionally
considered the consequences of the former error the more serious:
[T]he long-standing Western concern that only the guilty should
suffer under the criminal law . . . prompted Hale to remark in the

late 1600's that five guilty men should be acquitted before one innocent man is convicted. This kind of ratio, expressing toleration for
acquitting the guilty, has become a stock figure of common law
rhetoric; Blackstone raised the ratio to ten to one, and others of
libertarian sentiment have favored twenty to one. 16

It has been urged that Chinese disregard of procedural protections precludes efficient determination of culpability. Much criticism of Chinese
criminal law, however, attacks an assumed readiness on the part of the
Communist leaders to trade at a ratio below our own. Such an assumption cannot be verified simply by noting the use of non-Western techniques;
indeed, presently available data appear inadequate conclusively to establish its validity. Use of a different weighting, which nevertheless may
seem probable, does not ipso facto justify moral revulsion: we ourselves
17
are willing to exchange.
14. A.P. HERBERT, TH4 UNCOMMON LAw 24-29 (1935).
15. Id. at 26, 28.
16. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-ofPersuasionPractices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 881-82 (1968).
17. Our attitude is best exemplified by a perhaps untrue story told of George
Bernard Shaw. One evening he asked an attractive dinner partner if she would be
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Criminal punishment in Communist China combines productive labor
with an intensive program of thought reform. The importance of the
prisoner as a worker reflects an approach akin to that urged during the
19th century by Jeremy Bentham in his planned Panopticon system, under
which penal institutions were to be operated by private contractors for
personal gain:
He himself did not see "why labour should be the less reforming for
being profitable." . . . [H]e proposed that the working hours be "as

many of the four and twenty as the demand for meals and sleep leave
unengaged." His program for the six working days specified oneand-a-half hours for meals, seven-and-a-half for sleep, one hour for
exercise, and fourteen for work. "Are fourteen hours out of twentyfour too many for even a sedentary trade? Not more than what I
have seen gone through in health and cheerfulness in a workhouse
by honest poor." Indeed the number could as well be fifteen, "without the smallest hardship," for "let it not be forgotten, meal times
are times of rest: feeding is recreation.""'
Other aspects of the scheme manifest an equally Chinese lack of solicitude
toward individual liberties: "Provision was also made for the 'subsidiary
establishment' to house and employ not only released prisoners but also, as
one member of parliament put it, 'all those persons of blasted character who,
though acquitted for want of legal proof, were thought to be guilty.' "i9
Concern for rehabilitation is striking. Confession may serve "not so
much to verify a prisoner's guilt as to give him a chance to make his first
step toward reform" (p. 396). One 6-day local campaign to rouse
offenders "consciously to give over their hearts" produced a multiplicity
of admissions: "284 persons thought of insurrection, 34 thought of escape,
261 were suspicious of the government and its policies, 299 had not admitted their guilt, and 22 were dissatisfied with the government and hostile
toward the cadres and the masses" (p. 602). In traditional China capital
punishment was imposed only with great reluctance.20 Under modern
practice, execution of prisoners sentenced to death is frequently delayed
pending observation of progress toward reform. As might be expected
given the prospect of substitution of a lesser penalty if conduct is satisfactory, impressive ideological strides are frequently reported. Release
seems often conditioned on development of approved attitudes. Willingness
to continue participation in a punitive program at times appears to be
considered an important indication of successful rehabilitation. A 1959
report noted :
In a little over a year some persons undergoing rehabilitation through
labor have already reformed relatively well, and they have been diswilling to spend the night with him for $10,000. She responded affirmatively. He
then asked if she would be willing to spend the night with him for ten dollars. When
she asked what kind of girl he thought she was he answered that that had already
been determined and that they were now merely negotiating over price.
18. G. HIMMELVARB, VICTORIAN MINDS 51-52 (1968).
19. Id. at 67.

20. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 134-43.
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charged from rehabilitation through labor. Most of these persons
have applied to renain in their rehabilitation through labor units and
to get employment there; indicating their determination honestly to
rely on their own labor for their future livelihood (p. 629).
As presented by Professor Cohen, the Chinese legal system appears
to parallel the American approach to treatment of juvenile offenders prior
to recent judicial interposition of procedural safeguards. 2 '

Our courts

have characterized controlling statutes as noncriminal, preferring to consider them "administrative police regulations of a corrective character."
Rehabilitation and not punishment is their avowed goal. Behavior subjecting the individual to judicial supervision may be defined only as "growing
up in idleness and crime" or "engaging in immoral conduct." Confinement for an indefinite period is common. Officials stress the value of
22
confession; counsel for the child plays at best an attenuated role.

The materials collected by Professor Cohen offer 'emarkable teaching opportunities to the imaginative instructor. Their use can hardly be
recommended too highly.
Robert L. Birmingham*
21. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Comment, In Re Gault: Understanding
the Attorney's New Role, 12 VILL. L. Rzv. 803 (1967).
22. See 0.
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